






























































One of the most important tasks that economists face in environmental policymaking
is the evaluation of the costs and benefits of existing and proposed regulations.  For example,
the EPA recently conducted extensive prospective and retrospective analyses of the costs of
the Clean Air Act (EPA, 1997 and 1999).  Those analyses, and others like them, will play an
important role in determining future policies.
An extensive recent literature has called into question the results of conventional
analyses of the costs of environmental regulation.  This literature has focused on two general-
equilibrium effects that appear in an economy with pre-existing distortionary taxes.
1  The
first, the revenue-recycling effect, appears when a pollution tax or similar instrument generates
revenue for the government, thus permitting a reduction in distortionary tax rates and a
corresponding gain in efficiency.  This gain is offset by a loss from the tax-interaction effect,
which arises because the pollution tax drives up the price of consumption goods, lowering the
real wage and discouraging labor supply.  This exacerbates the tax distortion in the labor
market, creating an efficiency loss.  As a result of these interactions, the economy-wide costs
of regulation may differ substantially from the sum of firms’ abatement costs.
As this paper will show, however, general-equilibrium interactions can have an equally
large effect on the benefits of environmental regulation.  This effect has largely been ignored
by the prior literature, which has implicitly assumed that improved environmental quality
does not influence individuals’ labor supply decisions, and therefore that the benefits of
reduced pollution are unchanged from the first-best case.  That assumption may be valid in
certain cases, such as the protection of an endangered species with substantial existence value,
which could be represented as a separable term in consumer utility.  It is a much less
reasonable assumption, however, for the wide range of cases in which pollution affects
productivity or health.
Such cases are of substantial interest for environmental policy.  For example, a
significant proportion of the benefits of avoiding global warming appear in the form of
                                                
1 Among the many papers on this topic are Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1994), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995), Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), and Fullerton and Metcalf
(2000).2
avoided losses to agricultural productivity, while much of the damages from airborne
pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions appear as damages to human
health.  In these cases, the benefits of pollution regulation also affect labor supply decisions,
producing an additional tax-interaction effect
2 from the benefits of regulation.  This benefit-
side tax-interaction effect varies greatly depending on the effects of the pollutant in question,
and can either magnify or diminish the benefits of pollution regulation.
This paper presents a model of environmental regulation that allows pollution to have
a wide range of different effects, including not only direct effects on utility, but also
productivity effects in different industries and a range of health effects.
The paper demonstrates that when reduced pollution leads to increased labor
productivity, this will encourage labor supply, and thus tax interactions will magnify the
benefits of regulation.  In contrast, if a cleaner environment boosts the productivity of a fixed
factor, then tax interactions will reduce the benefit of regulation.
When the benefits of reduced pollution appear in the form of reduced medical
expenses, this creates an income effect that discourages labor supply, and thus such benefits
are diminished by the benefit-side tax-interaction effect.  When pollution causes increased
time lost to illness (but does not affect medical expenses) the sign of the benefit-side tax-
interaction effect is ambiguous, and depends on the labor tax rate and labor supply elasticity.
Though the model explicitly considers environmental regulation, its results and the
concept of the benefit-side tax-interaction effect apply equally to other types of regulation
affecting health or productivity.
The next section of the paper presents an analytically tractable general-equilibrium
model that allows for a broad range of effects of pollution and derives an expression for the
welfare effects of regulation.  The following sections evaluate this expression for pollutants
that affect only utility, pollutants that affect productivity, and pollutants that affect health.
                                                
2 The prior literature has referred to a single tax-interaction effect.  This paper extends that concept to a
general class of tax-interaction effects.  These effects are general equilibrium welfare changes resulting from
changes in the quantity demanded of a taxed good caused by forces outside the market for that good.  The
previously identified tax-interaction effect is a change in the demand for leisure caused when the cost of
regulation drives up the price of consumer goods.  The benefit-side tax-interaction effect introduced in this
paper is a change in the demand for leisure resulting from improved environmental quality.3
The final section discusses potential extensions to this model, suggests avenues for future
work and draws conclusions for policy decisions.
II. The Model
This section presents a simple general-equilibrium model that incorporates a
household labor-leisure decision along with a pollution externality.  Thus, the model
incorporates production of two goods, one of which has an associated pollution externality,
and includes a government sector and distortionary income tax.
This model takes a similar approach to the analytical model used by Parry, Williams,
and Goulder (1999) to examine the effects of carbon emissions regulation in a tax-distorted
economy.  This model is distinct, however, in that environmental quality no longer appears
only as a separable term in the utility function, but also may affect production efficiency and
the health of the representative agent.  Furthermore, this model generalizes the production
function, allowing for the possibility of profits in production, which prove to play an
important role in determining the effects of pollution regulation in the presence of
distortionary taxation.
A. Assumptions
A representative agent model is assumed, where households divide their time
endowment  (T) between leisure (l) and labor (L), which is used to produce the two
consumption goods, X and Y.  Households divide their income between consumption of X
and Y in order to maximize the utility function
(1)    U V l,X,Y ( ) ,Q ( )
which is continuous and quasi-concave, and where Q is environmental quality.
Good X causes a negative externality, either in consumption or in production (since
consumption equals production in this model, the two are equivalent) while good Y involves
no such externality.  Environmental quality is simply equal to an exogenous baseline level
minus emissions, with units normalized such that the production and consumption of one unit
of X results in one unit of emissions:4
(2) Q = Q- X
This model allows environmental quality to have several different possible effects.
The simplest case follows previous work in assuming that the externality enters as a separable
term in the utility function.  Alternatively, the externality could affect production of one or
both of the consumption goods.  Thus, production of the two consumption goods will follow
(3) X = FX LX,Q ( )
and
(4) Y = F Y LY,Q ( )
where LX and LY are the labor used in production of goods X and Y, respectively.
Finally, the externality could affect the health of the population, either causing the
representative agent to spend time sick (reducing the time available for labor or leisure) or by
forcing expenditure on medical care
3 (which is assumed to be produced directly from labor,
with one unit of labor producing one unit of medical care).  This implies the following
household time constraint
(5) T = L +l +S Q ( ) = LX + LY +LM +l+ S Q ( )
where S(Q) represents time spent sick, which is decreasing in Q, and LM is the labor used to
produce medical care.
To control this externality, the government levies a corrective tax of tX per unit of the
dirty good, X.  Previous papers
4 have shown that there is a substantial cost advantage to using
an environmental tax in preference to a quota or system of grandfathered tradable permits in
the presence of distortionary labor taxation, because of the efficiency gain from recycling the
pollution tax revenues.  Because this paper is not concerned with the distinction between taxes
and quotas, it models only the use of a corrective tax.  Both industries are assumed to price
                                                
3 Section II.E relaxes the assumption that pollution forces households to purchase medical care, allowing
households to choose the level of medical care they consume.
4 See, for example, Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1999), Goulder et al
(1999), and Fullerton and Metcalf (2000).5
output at marginal cost and pay labor its marginal product, and the gross wage is normalized






Since there is no tax on good Y, its price is given by:




If either production function is not homogenous of degree one in labor input, there will be
profits in production of that good, which implicitly represent rents to some fixed factor in
production.  Total profits, (p), which are assumed to accrue to households, follow
(8) p = pX -tX ( )X+ pYY - LX -LY
Finally, the government levies a tax on all income at the rate tL in order to finance
government spending (G), which is assumed to consist entirely of transfers to households, and
is exogenously fixed.  Thus, the household budget constraint is:
(9)     1-tL ( ) L+p+G ( )= pXX+ p YY+M Q ( )
where M(Q) represents medical care required, which is decreasing in Q and is produced
following M= LM.   The government’s budget constraint is
(10)     G=tL L+p+G ( )+tXX
Households maximize utility (1) subject to their time constraint (5) and budget
constraint (9), taking government transfers, prices, the labor tax rate, and the environmental
tax rate as given.  This yields the first order conditions:
(11) UX = pXl; UY = pYl ; Ul = 1-t L ( )l
where l represents the marginal utility of income.
These first-order conditions, together with the other equations given thus far,
implicitly define the Marshallian demand functions:
(12)    X pX,p Y,tL,p,Q ( );    Y pX,p Y,tL,p,Q ( );    l p X,pY,tL,p,Q ( )6
Note that while G would ordinarily appear as an argument in these demand functions, because
G is fixed, it has been omitted.
Effects of Taxing the Polluting Good
Taking a derivative of utility with respect to the corrective tax (tX) while allowing l, X,























Taking a derivative of the production equation for good X (3) with respect to tX,









































Taking a derivative of the household time constraint (5) with respect to tX while





































where tP is the Pigouvian tax level, equal to the marginal damage from emissions, including




















Revenue raised by the tax on good X allows an offsetting cut in the labor tax rate.






























 and rearranging give

















































L+p +G ( )-t L
¶l
¶t L
The ratio of the numerator to the denominator is the ratio of the marginal revenue from the











This is the efficiency cost of raising an additional dollar of labor tax revenue when
revenue is not returned to households, or the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) minus
one.  The numerator is therefore the marginal deadweight loss in the labor market, while
the denominator is the marginal revenue from a change in the tax rate.
5
Z applies in the case in which revenue is not returned to households, because it does
not include an income effect from increased transfers to households.  The corresponding
term that does include this income effect is the partial equilibrium marginal excess burden
(MEB) of the labor tax, given by:
(21)
  








                                                
5 This is a “non-environmental” definition of the MCPF; it omits the effects of changes in environmental
quality and environmental tax revenue that would result from a change in the labor tax.8































equations (19), (20) and (21) into (17) and collecting terms gives an expression for the
welfare effect of the tax on good X:
(22)
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This expression decomposes the welfare effect into the three components described in
the prior literature: the primary welfare effect, (dW
P
), the revenue-recycling effect, (dW
R
) and
the (cost-side) tax-interaction effect (dW
I
), plus an additional term, the benefit-side tax-
interaction effect (dW
IB
).  The primary welfare effect is the effect of the tax on the pollution
externality, equal to the wedge between the social cost of emissions (the Pigouvian tax) and
the private cost (the tax on good X).  The revenue-recycling effect is the efficiency gain from
using pollution tax revenue to reduce the labor tax rate, which equals Z times the marginal
pollution tax revenue.
Finally, the two tax-interaction effects result when the pollution tax alters households’
labor supply decisions, exacerbating or ameliorating the income tax distortion in the labor
market.  For the cost-side tax-interaction effect dW
I
 (which has been examined in previous
studies on this topic) the pollution tax drives up the costs of producing consumer goods,
lowering the real wage and discouraging labor supply.
The benefit-side tax-interaction effect dW
IB
 expresses the impact of improved
environmental quality on labor supply decisions, through increased labor productivity or
improved consumer health.  This term did not appear in previous studies, which assumed that
environmental quality entered only as a separable term in the utility function. This
assumption implied that environmental quality did not influence labor supply, and thus did
not create a tax interaction effect.9
The effect dW
IB
 will vary substantially depending on what form the benefits of a
better environment take.  If environmental quality affects production, then an improved
environment can result in lower prices for the affected consumption goods, raising the real
wage and encouraging labor supply.  If environmental quality reduces time spent sick,
households will have more time available for work. 
 On the other hand, if an improved
environment reduces medical expenses, households will have more disposable income and
therefore less need to work.
Each of the two tax-interaction effects is equal to the distortionary wedge in the labor
market (the income tax) times the change in labor supply resulting from the policy.  Added
to this is the value of any gain or loss in labor tax revenue from the change in labor supply,
which equals the change in tax revenue times Z.  Summing those elements for the change in
labor supply from the pollution tax gives the third term in (22), and a similar sum for the
change in labor supply from improved environmental quality gives the fourth term.
As has been repeatedly shown in the prior literature (see, for example, Parry (1995)),
if the polluting good is a relative complement to leisure (more complementary than the
average consumption good), then the cost of environmental regulation will be lower than if it
is a relative substitute for leisure.  For simplicity, we consider the neutral assumption that
goods X and Y are equal net substitutes for leisure.
6  Given this assumption, the cost-side tax-
interaction effect can be expressed (see appendix for derivation) as
(23) dW
I = ZX




IB = - ¢  Z  1-tL ( )
dp
dtX







































Together, these imply that the total effect of a pollution tax follows (substituting (23) and
(24) into (22))
                                                
6 Some other papers on second-best environmental taxes (e.g., Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) and
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)) make the assumptions that utility is homothetic and that it is weakly
separable between leisure and consumption.  Together, those assumptions are sufficient to imply that all
























































This indicates that the cost of a pollution tax (the first term) is equal to 1+Z times the primary
cost of the policy, a familiar result from the prior literature.  The total benefit equals the
primary benefit of the policy (the second term) plus the benefit-side tax-interaction effect
(the remaining terms).
The following sections examine the implications of each of the different effects of
environmental quality for the benefit-side tax-interaction effect, and therefore for the optimal
pollution tax and the potential benefits of pollution regulation.
B. Labor-Supply-Neutral Externality
This section assumes that environmental quality appears as a separable term in the
utility function, that it has no effect on either health or production, and that production












 and p  all equal
zero.  The prior literature has assumed benefits of this form because in this case changes in
environmental quality have no effect on labor supply, and therefore there is no benefit-side
tax-interaction effect.  This can be seen by examining the third term in (25), which equals
zero in this case.












Here, the costs of regulation are magnified by interaction with the tax system, but





which is substantially less than the Pigouvian tax.11
C. Externality Affecting Production
This section assumes that environmental quality affects production of one or both










 all equal zero.  In this case, the benefits of pollution regulation will also interact with
the labor-market distortion, creating a benefit-side tax interaction in addition to the cost-side
tax interaction demonstrated by the prior literature.  Using the assumption that there are no







= 1+ Z ( ) tX -tP ( )
dX
dt X
- ¢  Z  1-tL ( )
dp
dt X
In this case, improved environmental quality lowers the marginal production cost (and
therefore the price) for one or both consumption goods, increasing the real wage and
encouraging labor supply.  Thus, the benefit-side tax-interaction effect produces an
additional gain, magnifying the benefits of the pollution tax to the same extent that the costs
are magnified.  In this case, solving for the optimal pollution tax gives
(29) tX
* =t P +






When environmental quality has no effect on profits (rents) this expression reduces to
the Pigouvian tax level.  Thus, as long as changes in environmental quality have no effect on
profits, the formula for the optimal pollution tax is unchanged by interactions with the
distorted labor market.
7  In this case, both the costs and benefits of the policy are magnified
by the same amount.  Hence, the optimal pollution tax is the Pigouvian tax, just as in the first-
best case.
                                                
7 While the formula for the optimal pollution tax in this case is the same with or without distortionary
taxation, equal to the marginal damage from pollution, the actual value for the optimal tax rate will
generally be different, because the value of marginal damages will generally change when distortionary
taxation is introduced.12
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) achieve a similar result through a somewhat
different model.  The results from this section generalize and extend their analysis in three
main respects.  First, their analysis assumed that environmental quality affects all industries
equally.  The model presented here allows environmental quality to have a different effect on
productivity in each industry, and demonstrates that the optimal pollution tax is the same as in
the first-best case even if the effect of pollution differs across industries.
Second, this model calculates not only the optimal pollution tax, but also the welfare
gain from implementing the optimal tax, showing that when environmental quality affects
production, the optimal tax is the same, but the potential gain from pollution regulation is
substantially greater than in the first-best case.  Interaction with the tax system magnifies both
the benefits and the costs of pollution regulation to the same degree; each is equal to the
MCPF times its first-best level.  The welfare gain from any given pollution tax, being equal to
the benefits minus the costs, is magnified to the same extent as benefits and costs.  Thus, the
potential gain from pollution regulation in the second-best is equal to the MCPF times the
potential gain in a first-best setting.
Third, this model allows for rents from production of one or both goods, and
demonstrates that the optimal pollution tax is the same as in the first-best case only if
environmental quality has no effect on producer rents.  As can be seen from examining
equation (30), if increased environmental quality does increase rents, then the optimal
pollution tax will be lower than the Pigouvian level (note that the denominator of the second
term is negative).
8  Unlike increased labor productivity, increased profits represent a benefit
with no direct effect on labor supply.  As a result, benefits in the form of increased profits are
not magnified by tax interactions.  Since the costs are still magnified, if any benefits come in
the form of increased rents, the optimal pollution tax will be less than the Pigouvian tax.
9
Global climate change may well have effects of this kind–to the extent that global warming
                                                
8 This result is similar to that found by Williams (1999) in the context of optimal tariffs on international
trade in a tax-distorted economy.
9 On the other hand, if improved environmental quality increases labor productivity but reduces rents (by
reducing the productivity of a fixed factor such as land), the optimal second-best tax will exceed the
Pigouvian tax.  It is difficult to conceive of an example of such a case, however.13
decreases the productivity of farmland, preventing climate change will preserve landowners’
rents.
D. Externality with Health Effects
This section considers the case where environmental quality has health effects, but no









 equal zero.  For
simplicity, this section also assumes that production exhibits constant returns to scale, so
p =0.  Like productivity effects, health effects will influence labor supply decisions, and the
sign of the change in labor supply will depend on the particular form of the health effect.
Using the assumption that there are no utility or productivity effects gives a simplified
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Examining this expression shows that if an improved environment results in lower
expenses for medical care, the benefit-side tax-interaction effect will reduce the benefit of
regulation, whereas if an improved environment allows individuals to lose less time to illness,
then the sign of the benefit-side tax-interaction effect is ambiguous and depends on the tax
rate and labor elasticities.
This result appears because both types of health damage cause an income effect.
Reducing either medical expenses or time lost to illness increases household disposable
income, causing increased consumption of leisure and exacerbating the labor market
distortion.  An offsetting effect occurs when an improved environment reduces time lost to
illness because households have more time available for labor, thus generating a gain from
additional labor tax revenues.




























which is less than the Pigouvian tax level.  It may be more or less than the optimum tax in the
earlier case where environmental quality had a separable effect on utility–depending on14
whether the sum of the second and third terms in the numerator is positive or negative–but
will likely be lower.  If improved environmental quality results in decreased medical expenses,
then the optimal tax will be lower, whereas if it results in decreased time spent sick, the
optimal tax may be higher or lower.
























÷   then the optimal tax will be
lower than in the case when environmental quality had no effect on labor supply. Assuming
that the labor tax rate is 0.4, the MCPF is 1.11 (implying that Z=0.11), and the MEB is 0.3
10
suggests that the optimal tax will be lower than when environmental quality doesn’t affect
labor supply if either type of health effect is present.  Only if the MCPF is large relative to the
MEB (which will occur when the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is large compared to
the income elasticity of labor supply), and if the fraction of benefits that appear as reduced
medical costs are small relative to the gain from reduced time lost to sickness, will the optimal
tax be greater than when pollution doesn’t affect labor supply.
Table 1 summarizes the results from the last three sections, showing the marginal
benefits of regulation and the optimal level of the pollution tax for the different channels
through which pollution can affect welfare.  It shows that the benefit-side tax-interaction
effect magnifies benefits that take the form of improved labor productivity (thus increasing
the optimal level of regulation) but diminishes benefits that take the form of improved health
(thus reducing the optimal level of regulation).  These effects on the benefits of regulation
are of roughly the same magnitude as the effects on the costs of regulation addressed by the
prior literature.
E. Extending the Model to Allow Consumer Choice in Health Care
Thus far, we have assumed that consumers have no choice in their consumption of
medical care, which is determined only by the level of environmental quality.  This section
                                                
10 An uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.15 and an income elasticity of labor supply of –0.25,
together with a labor tax rate of 0.4 imply these values for the MCPF and MEB.  These elasticities are
roughly consistent with those found by Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998) in a survey of labor
economists.  A labor tax rate of 0.4 is a standard assumption in the literature, as in Browning (1987).15
expands the previous model, allowing consumers to choose their medical spending, and
adding consumer health as an argument in the utility function.  In this extended model, the
sign of the benefit-side tax-interaction effect is somewhat smaller, but its sign stays the same.
For simplicity, this section will assume that the only effect of environmental quality is
on individual health.  Therefore, environmental quality will not appear directly in the utility
or production functions.  In the extended model presented in this section, utility directly
depends on health.  Thus, equation (1) becomes
11
(1') U V l, X,Y ( ),H ( )
where H is consumer health, which is assumed to be weakly separable from leisure and
consumption.
12  Health is determined by the level of environmental quality and by individual
spending on medical care.  Thus
(32) H = H M,Q ( )
which is continuous, quasi-concave, and increasing in both M and Q.  M is now chosen by the
consumer, rather than being a function of environmental quality as in the earlier model.  For
simplicity, all production is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, which implies that
there are no rents.
In this extended model, the cost-side tax-interaction effect is unchanged.  The

















Making the same assumption as before, that both consumption goods are equal
substitutes for leisure, implies that the total effect of a pollution tax can be approximated as
                                                
11 Throughout this section, each equation that replaces a corresponding equation from the earlier model will
denoted by the number of the equation it replaces and a prime (').  Thus, equation (1') replaces equation (1)
in this extended model.
12 For the same reasons as in the case where environmental quality appears in the utility function, the
benefit-side tax-interaction effect would differ if health appeared as a non-separable term.  There is no
obvious reason why one would expect good health to favor consumption over leisure or vice-versa.  Thus,
the separability assumption here represents a reasonable central case.  Furthermore, if health were not
weakly separable in utility, then it would be optimal for the government to tax (if health is a leisure


























As in the previous model, where individuals had no choice in their consumption of
medical care, the benefit-side tax-interaction effect reduces the benefit of a cleaner
environment.  When individuals can choose how much medical care they consume, the effects
of a cleaner environment will appear in two ways: improved health and reduced medical
expenses.  The effect on leisure demand and the consequent benefit-side tax-interaction
effect will simply combine the effects of improved health and reduced medical expenses on
leisure demand.
So long as health enters as a weakly separable term in the utility function, improved
health will not affect the labor/leisure choice and therefore will not create a benefit-side tax-
interaction effect.  Reduced medical spending, however, does affect leisure demand.  As in the
previous model, reduced medical spending raises household disposable income, resulting in
increased demand for leisure.  Thus, to the extent that improved environmental quality results
in reduced medical spending
13, the benefit-side tax-interaction effect will be negative, and
therefore the benefits of a given environmental tax will be lower.
The magnitude of the benefit-side tax-interaction effect in this case is smaller than in
the earlier case where consumers had no choice in their consumption of health care, because
in this case consumers take part of the benefit of improved environmental quality in the form
of improved health.  Thus, a given environmental improvement produces a smaller reduction
in health care expenditure and consequently a smaller benefit-side tax-interaction effect.
Still, the concept behind the benefit-side tax-interaction, and the sign of the effect remain the
same.


























                                                
13 Note that the benefit-side tax-interaction effect could be positive in this case if the effect of improved
environmental quality were to increase health care expenditure.  This seems unlikely, and thus such a case is
not considered here.17
As would be expected, the negative benefit-side tax-interaction effect again leads to
an optimal pollution tax that is below the optimal tax if environmental quality were to appear
as a separable term in the utility function, and is well below the Pigouvian level.
III. Conclusions
Prior research has shown that interactions with a tax-distorted labor market can
significantly magnify the costs of pollution regulation, and that the extent to which those
costs are magnified will depend on the regulatory instrument used.  This paper demonstrates
that a similar principle holds on the benefit side.  The benefit-side tax interaction effect can
magnify or diminish the benefits of reduced pollution, with the effect depending on just what
form such benefits take. This effect is potentially very important; it can alter the benefits of
environmental regulation to as great an extent as the second-best effects noted by the prior
literature change the costs of regulation.
When the benefits of regulation do not affect labor supply–the case typically
considered in the prior literature–such benefits are neither magnified nor diminished by
interactions with a distorted labor market.  Since these interactions do magnify the costs of
regulation, the potential benefit from regulation is lower than in the first-best case, as is the
optimal level of regulation.
In contrast, when the benefit from reduced pollution is to increase production
efficiency in one or more industries, the benefit-side tax interaction can substantially magnify
the benefits of pollution regulation.  This gain depends on what proportion of the increased
efficiency appears as increased labor productivity, and what proportion appears as increased
profits (rents to an implicit fixed factor).  If the entire benefit comes in the form of increased
labor productivity, then the benefits are magnified to the same extent as the costs of
regulation.  Thus, the optimal pollution tax is the same as in the first-best case, and the
potential net welfare gain from regulation is substantially increased.
If, on the other hand, the entire benefit comes in the form of increased rents, then
there is no benefit-side tax interaction, just as in the case in which environmental quality does
not affect labor supply.  Thus, the optimal pollution tax and the net gain from imposing that18
tax will be lower than they would be in the first-best case.  A large portion of the benefits of
preventing global climate change might fall into this category, preserving the value of
agricultural land, but having little effect on labor productivity.
When pollution affects health, the sign of the benefit-side interaction depends on
whether the gain from reduced pollution appears as reduced medical costs, fewer lost work
days, or some combination of the two.  Interactions with the distorted labor market diminish
the benefit of reducing medical costs, but have an ambiguous effect on the benefit of
reducing time lost to illness.  Estimates of labor elasticities suggest that the optimal pollution
tax in a case with both health effects will be lower than when the environmental quality
doesn’t affect labor supply, and will be dramatically lower than in the first-best case, because
in this case interactions with the tax system magnify the policy’s costs while diminishing its
benefits.
While this model focuses only on the case of environmental regulation, the insight it
provides is more general. The benefit-side tax-interaction effect depends not on the particular
type of regulation, but on the labor-supply effects of improved health or productivity.  Thus,
this effect should apply equally to a broad range of other policies that affect health or
productivity, such as occupational health and safety rules or subsidies for research and
development.
Calculating the magnitude of these benefit-side tax interactions for the regulation of a
particular pollutant should not be too difficult.  The necessary parameter values–the
proportion of damages coming from each of the several possible channels–are typically
produced as intermediate steps in empirical studies that value pollution damages.
These benefit-side interactions can have just as great an effect as the cost-side
interactions considered by prior work.  Future studies, both of environmental regulation and
of other regulations affecting health and productivity, should consider the benefit-side tax
interactions as well as the cost-side tax interactions in estimating the optimal level of
regulation and the potential gains from such regulation.  Studies that fail to consider these
second-best effects could prove to be substantially misleading.19
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Table 1
Significance of Alternative Benefit Channels for the Effects of Regulation

























Z (marginal cost of public funds minus one) = 0.11
Z'(marginal excess burden) = 0.3
tL (pre-existing labor tax rate) = 0.4
Note: These parameter assumptions imply that the marginal cost of regulation in all cases is
111% of the marginal cost in the first-best case.A-1
Appendix
Derivation of Equation (23)
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where I is after-tax non-labor income.
Taking a total differential of the household utility function (1), holding the levels of utility
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Substituting (A9) into (A2) yields (23).
Derivation of Equation (24)






























































Taking a total derivative of the production function for good X (3), substituting in the
equation for the price of X (6) and rearranging yield
(A12)
  




and the same approach for good Y gives
(A13)
  




Taking a total derivative of profits (8) and substituting in (A12) and (A13) give
(A14)
  












Because the productivity effects of Q on l are already accounted for by the pX, pY and p
terms, the partial derivative 
¶l
¶Q
 represents only the health effects.  These affect demand by
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IB = -Z 1-tL ( )
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Z'-Z= 1+Z ( ) tL
¶l
¶I
Substituting (A18) into (A17) and rearranging yield equation (24).
Derivation of Equation (24')
Following a similar approach to that used in the original model, we can obtain the
same result as equation (17) for the effect of the pollution tax, though in this case, the
Pigouvian tax level tP is given by





































equations (19), (20) and (21) into (17), using    dpX = dt X ,    dpY = 0, and    dp=0 (which are
implied by the assumptions that environmental quality does not affect productivity and that
production exhibits constant returns to scale) and collecting terms gives an expression for the
welfare effect of the tax on good X:
(A20)
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which, not surprisingly, is again very similar to the same expression from the original model,
though the benefit-side tax-interaction effect term is greatly simplified by the assumption that
environmental quality does not affect productivity.  The expression for the benefit-side tax-











The change in spending on X, Y, and l for a change in I will equal
(A22) 1-t L ( )
¶l
¶I
























Weak separability of health in the utility function implies that leisure demand is
determined solely by the relative prices of l, X, and Y (which are not affected by changes in



















Substituting (A24) into (A21) and rearranging using (A18) yields equation (24')